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Problem-Solving as a Governing Knowledge: 
“Skills”-Testing in PISA and PIAAC 
Carol Bacchi 





This article scrutinizes critically a pervasive knowledge shaping contemporary 
sociopolitical relations and spaces—“problem-solving knowledge”. It devel-
ops the argument that, as a governing knowledge, “problem-solving” is in-
creasing in intensity and scope, with a range of negative and potentially dan-
gerous effects. As a case study, the article examines how problem-solving 
knowledge operates in the OECD “skills” assessment programs PISA and 
PIAAC, with a particularly worrying connection between so-called “cognitive 
abilities” and labour market performance. It considers how this “turn to 
cognition”, with its associated moralism, divides “citizens” into those who 
either can or who cannot solve “problems”, producing “more productive” 
and “less productive” categories of people. More broadly, these programs 
illustrate how treating “problems” as self-evident referents is deeply depo-
liticizing, highlighting the importance of examining how governing takes 
place through problematization. Through tracing the emergence and func-
tioning of “problem-solving” as a knowledge practice, the article encourages 
reflection on how problem-solving knowledge has come to be tak-
en-for-granted as “truth” and on how it operates to limit political debate and 
to regulate political subjects. 
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1. Introduction 
This article scrutinizes critically a pervasive knowledge shaping contemporary 
political and social relations—“problem-solving knowledge”. The concept of 
“problem-solving” is ubiquitous in everyday conversation and political debate. 
How to cite this paper: Bacchi, C. (2020). 
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The words “problem-solving” may not always be used, but the underlying pre-
mise that “problems” or some other placeholder (e.g. “issues”, “challenges”, 
“concerns”) need “solving” or “addressing” is pervasive. “Problem-solving” is 
treated as some sort of natural or innate capacity, describing How We Think, the 
title of John Dewey’s 1910 book (Dewey, 1910) and “all of life”, as in the title of 
Karl Popper’s 1994 book, All Life is Problem Solving (Popper, 2013).  
This article puts these propositions into question. It suggests the need to re-
flect on how we have come to think that thinking involves solving problems, and 
to consider the implications of accepting this view. To be clear, the goal is not to 
offer a new interpretation of how people think—the article is not a contribution 
to psychology—but to consider the political implications of a particular model of 
thinking, problem-solving1.  
The article highlights two concerns: first, problem-solving knowledge divides 
“citizens” into those who either can or who cannot solve “problems”, producing 
“more productive” and “less productive” categories of people; and second, prob-
lem-solving knowledge assumes the existence of discrete and self-evident “prob-
lems”, detracting attention from the ways in which governing takes place 
through the creation of “problems” as particular sorts of problems—through 
problematization (see Bacchi 2009; Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016). Hence, while 
“problem-solving” is commonly aligned with critical thinking, to the contrary, 
problem-solving, as a governing knowledge, creates politically quiescent, divided 
and self-regulating citizens. 
The article proceeds in four parts. The next section introduces the Fou-
cault-influenced poststructural stance informing the analysis. Section 3 offers an 
abbreviated genealogy of problem-solving knowledge, emphasizing the diversity 
in conceptions of problem-solving. Section 4 examines the place of prob-
lem-solving knowledge in the contemporary “skills”-testing programs PISA 
(Programme for International Student Assessment) and PIAAC (Programme for 
the International Assessment of Adult Competencies). Section 5 reviews strate-
gies to disrupt problem-solving knowledge, and is followed by a short Conclu-
sion.  
2. Background and Approach 
Calling problem-solving a “governing knowledge” indicates a poststructural ap-
proach to the topic. A knowledge, as used here, refers to the French sense of sa-
voir as a form of background knowledge or “truth” discourse. This usage draws 
on Foucault’s distinction between connaissance knowledge, to refer to specific 
disciplines, and savoir knowledge, to refer to the knowledge base necessary for 
 
 
1Grammatically “problem-solving” should have a hyphen when it is an adjective but not when it is a 
noun. The author has adopted the convention of hyphenation in most cases to signal that, in its 
pervasiveness, problem-solving knowledge operates as an event, in the Foucauldian sense, “the in-
terweaving of relations of power and domination” (Tamboukou, 1999: p. 207): “Events are not 
simply bits of data; they need to be analyzed in terms of the practices that give rise to them” (Bacchi 
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those disciplines to be produced (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016: pp. 35-36). As savoir, 
problem-solving knowledge is situated rather than transcendental. Borrowing 
John Law’s (2009: p. 3) helpful phrase, it is a “contexted truth”. 
The term “governing”, as in “a governing knowledge”, refers to the practices 
of organizing and administering society, with no sense of conscious intent or 
manipulation. This term signals links to the analytic tradition of governmentali-
ty studies or an “analytics of government” (see Inda, 2005; Lemke, 2007). In this 
tradition attention is directed to the symbolic/material assemblages through 
which governing takes place, referred to as governmental technologies.  
It is useful, therefore, to think about problem-solving knowledge as operating 
across three interconnected domains:  
first, the domain of background knowledge (savoir); 
second, the domain of disciplines (connaissances); and 
third, the domain of governmental technologies, a topic pursued in Section 4 
of the article.  
Across these three domains problem-solving tends to be described either as a 
method of analysis (a procedure) or as a cognitive ability or skill, and often as 
both. As a procedure, problem-solving invokes the standard steps of scientific 
experimentation—problem recognition, hypothesis-testing and resolution. As a 
“cognitive ability”, problem-solving is coming to be seen as a usable proxy for 
educational attainment, conventionally offered as a measure of a nation’s “hu-
man capital”.  
The operation of human capital as a knowledge/discourse has attracted its due 
share of attention among critical scholars (Bacchi, 2009: pp. 217-219). The purpose 
of this article is to bring such critical scrutiny to problem-solving as a key governing 
logic of our age. To undertake this task, following Foucault, attention is directed to 
the interconnected sets of practices involved in the production of problem-solving 
knowledge, including practices of emergence, insertion/institutionalization and 
functioning (Foucault, 1972: p. 163; Foucault, 1991a: p. 65). 
The next section traces the practices of emergence and institutionalization of 
problem-solving knowledge in an abbreviated genealogy. The subsequent Sec-
tion 4 uses the OECD “skills”-testing programs, PISA and PIAAC, to illustrate 
the practices of functioning of problem-solving knowledge—the ways in which 
problem-solving knowledge operates to shape social and political relations in 
contemporary western societies and international organizations. Reflections on 
the possibility of disrupting problem-solving knowledge appear in Section 5, 
followed by a brief Conclusion. 
3. An Abbreviated Genealogy of Problem-Solving Knowledge  
(Practices of Emergence and Insertion/Institutionalization)  
The starting point for this analysis is recognition that there is more than one in-
carnation of problem-solving, making generalizations dangerous. For heuristic 
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guration and a more “technocratic” version of problem-solving, which depends 
on “expert” management and which currently dominates the intellectual and 
policy landscape. 
The point of a genealogy is to discern how we have got “here” from “there”, 
with “here” in this instance signaling the dominance of “technocratic” (“ex-
pert-led”) problem-solving knowledge. The emphasis in a genealogy is not on 
some linear narrative or path dependence but on the plurality of factors and in-
fluences that happened along the way. That plurality of factors comprises a dis-
cursive practice, otherwise referred to as an assemblage or a dispositif (Bacchi & 
Bonham, 2014). What we find, in such a genealogical study, is nuance and com-
plexity rather than a direct line of development. At the same time, it is important 
to reflect on the politics and power that lead to the promotion of certain devel-
opments rather than others, all the while acknowledging the contestation sur-
rounding those developments.  
Turning first to the domain of background knowledge, as noted at the outset, 
we all talk about “solving problems”. We hear and use the phrase every day in 
news reports on diverse topics. Government officials report on their efforts to 
solve problems on a regular basis. Policy-making is understood in terms of ef-
forts to solve “problems-that-exist”. Our classrooms are dedicated to extending 
problem-solving “skills”. Even researchers who raise critical questions about 
problem-solving often lapse into talking about “problems”, taken to be 
self-evident, that need to be “solved” (see Hajer & Versteeg, 2005: p. 177).  
Within the domain of disciplines, this powerful knowledge of problem-solving 
features prominently in the following fields: mathematics, medicine, public pol-
icy, social work, environmental studies, practice research, design thinking, busi-
ness and management studies, public health, alcohol and other drug policy, law, 
psychology, criminology, international relations, and education, among others. 
Each area invites detailed analysis to discover how problem-solving knowledge 
has achieved such prominence and to indicate important debates and contesta-
tion about its status. Here, mathematics, science studies, policy development, 
and education studies (including learning theories) are offered as exemplars.  
Turning a genealogical lens onto mathematics, where problem-solving clearly 
holds a privileged place, there is dispute about the very nature of prob-
lem-solving and the meaning of “problems”. Writing in 1992, Alan Schoenfeld 
notes that, while “there is general acceptance of the idea that the primary goal of 
mathematical instruction should be to have students become competent prob-
lem solvers”, “given the multiple interpretations of the term, the goal is hardly 
clear” (Schoenfeld, 1992: p. 334). In a 2017 OECD publication dedicated to elu-
cidating The Nature of Problem Solving (Csapó & Funke, 2017), John Dossey 
(2017: p. 60) concurs: 
While problem solving is at the heart of mathematics, there is little agree-
ment in the field about what problem solving is, what its boundaries are, or 
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life. 
Going further, Dossey quotes Gian-Carlo Rota, the “famed combinatorialist”, 
who wrote: 
Why don’t we tell the truth? No one has the faintest idea how the process of 
scientific induction works and by calling it a “process” we may be already 
making a dangerous assumption (Rota, 1986: p. 263 in Dossey, 2017: p. 60). 
For those looking to mathematics for a reliable model of problem-solving, 
therefore, it may be necessary to look elsewhere.  
In the scientific field, however, basic parameters are equally nebulous. STS 
(Science and Technology Studies) scholars have been prominent in contextua-
lizing the meaning of “problems” and “problem-solving” in science studies. 
Bruno Latour (1980: p. 53) refers to the “small word ‘problem’” as a “folk term” 
in science that ought to be subjected to sociological analysis, alongside other 
such terms. He praises his colleague, Michel Callon, for initiating such a project. 
Callon’s (1980) study of fuel cells and energy production reflected on how rival 
researchers actively produced the “problems” they studied—nowhere could 
“problems” be taken as the “origin of the research, nor purely cognitive” (Krohn, 
1980: xiv). 
In policy studies there is a long tradition that focuses precisely on prob-
lem-solving as a method of analysis. This tradition includes the classic rational 
policy-making framework associated with Marshall Dimock (1958), Herbert Al-
exander Simon (1961/1945), Eugene Bardach (1981), and Harold Lasswell. 
Lasswell’s (1951) “problem orientation” made scientific problem-solving “the 
defining characteristic of policy analysis” and the “policy sciences” (Turnbull, 
2008a: p. 73).  
Howlett (2010: p. 9) offers a contemporary version of this tradition. He uses 
the policy cycle, with its stages of “problem recognition”, “proposal of solution”, 
“selection of solution”, “putting solution into effect” and “monitoring results”, as 
a guide to policy-making. In addition, evidence-based policy, which for several 
decades has dominated policy initiatives and discussion in many countries, relies 
upon a problem-solving logic. This logic is indicated in the well-worn mantra 
“what works”. That is, interventions are tested to see “what works” to “fix” 
pre-set and taken-for-granted “problems” (Bacchi, 2009: pp. 252-255).  
As part of this abbreviated genealogy it is important to recognize the many 
interventions in the policy field that are committed to challenging “technocratic” 
problem-solving. A wide range of interpretive studies, including those involved 
in exploring problem definition (Dery, 1984) and problem framing (Entman, 
1993), problem setting (Turnbull, 2008b: p. 59) and problem posing (Fischer, 
2003: p. 216), put in question technocratic approaches to “given” problems.  
However, in the main, these studies continue to treat problems as self-evident 
referents (for exception see Kurze & Lenschow, 2018). For example, Hajer and 
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of the “people involved in finding solutions to environmental problems” in or-
der to “get at a deep understanding of what the problem ‘really’ is”. Such inter-
pretive studies target for analysis the competing conceptualizations of “prob-
lems-that-exist” produced by different groups of actors. The objective is to create 
a space for negotiating “mutual integration of arguments”, with consensus a de-
sired outcome (see Bacchi, 2015a).  
Bacchi’s (2009) “What’s the Problem Represented to be?” (WPR) approach 
offers a more substantive form of critique. Instead of focusing on how “prob-
lems” are “linguistically constructed” by various groups of actors (Hajer & Vers-
teeg, 2011: p. 688), it examines how governing takes place through problemati-
zations—how “problems” are produced as particular sorts of problems within 
policies and with what effects. Therefore, instead of calling for “more tolerance 
for the multiple ways to tell the story of a policy problem” (Gottweis, 1998: pp. 
334-335) it highlights the need to interrogate governmental problematizations 
(see Bacchi, 2015a).  
In the WPR approach, there are no problems separate from their problemati-
zations, meaning that governing takes place through problematizations, rather 
than through policies. As an analytic strategy, therefore, the WPR approach goes 
further than critiques that refer to the “elusiveness of the search to define the 
‘true’ nature of a policy problem” (Gottweis, 2003: p. 263) or to problems as 
“wicked” (Head, 2008, 2018) or to “problematicity” (Turnbull & Hoppe, 2018). 
It recasts the conventional “objects” of policy (“problems”) and disrupts the as-
sumed purposes of policy-making (“problem-solving”).  
3.1. Education and Models of Problem-Solving Knowledge 
Continuing our genealogical exploration, the field of education studies features 
prominently in the development of problem-solving knowledge, primarily 
through theories of learning. Returning to the heuristic distinction between 
“models” of problem-solving, a student-”friendly” version of problem-solving is 
associated with early twentieth-century functionalist psychology and American 
pragmatism, linked to the American philosopher John Dewey (Bredo, 1997: p. 
6). There are connections also with more recent theories of situated learning 
(Lave, 2009) and cognitive constructivism (Temiz, 2013; Savery & Duffy, 
1996). The emphasis in these approaches is on students as active learners. In 
Dewey, students are directly involved in selecting the “problems” to be solved. 
Moreover, they are understood to move back and forth to “the problem”, altering 
it or renegotiating it as learning takes place (Bredo, 1997: pp. 11-12).  
The second model—the “technocratic”, “expert-led” version of prob-
lem-solving—finds support within behaviouralism and cognitivism. As Bredo 
(1997: p. 30) describes, both these learning theories are committed to given, 
well-defined problems, “for without repetition of the ‘same’ problem, they would 
not know what ‘learning’ is”. The prominent place accorded cognitive theory in 
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next section of the article. The genealogical task becomes explaining the “victo-
ry” of cognitivist theory and the “failure” of student-friendly problem-solving.  
Part of the explanation for this development can be found in ambiguity within 
Dewey’s child-“friendly” problem-solving model, ambiguity that created an 
opening for technocratic developments. This ambiguity is due to Dewey’s insis-
tence on the existence of discernible, pre-existent starting points for “prob-
lems”—which he calls “indeterminate situations”—and his firm commitment to 
the scientific method (Shermis & Barth, 1983: p. 88).  
For Dewey, problem-solving is a response to an “indeterminate situation” as-
sociated with an existential “itch”, a tension “which actuates a person to seek a 
solution”. “Indeterminate situations” are conceptualized as “actual situations”, 
as existing in fact. To resolve the tension produced by such “‘practical’ troubles 
and difficulties” requires, says Dewey, a “new” way of thinking: a new way of 
processing information, based on the scientific method (Shermis & Barth, 1983: 
p. 88). 
Therefore, while children may be the ones who select the “problems” to 
“solve” in Deweyian problem-solving, these “problems” emerge from precogni-
tive, existential “indeterminate situations”, “actual situations which are them-
selves conflicting and confused” (Dewey, 1938: pp. 498-499). As Turnbull 
(2008b: p. 54) describes, social problems in Dewey similarly exist “independently 
of questions we might ask about them”. To “solve” these “problems-that-exist”, 
children and citizens are instructed to apply systematic and scientific prob-
lem-solving principles, which are taken-for-granted as “truth”.  
Richardson describes Dewey as “wavering between radically reformist stances 
in politics and his relatively optimistic and complacent embrace of technical ex-
pertise in the making of policy” (Richardson, 1998: p. 126; see also Fischer, 2000: 
p. 7). He (1998: p. 111) notes that Dewey’s commitment to “empirical science” as 
a “tool” to “liberate action from the bonds of routine and caprice” can be seen to 
make Dewey a “friend of technocracy”.  
Dewey was not alone in his infatuation with science, a position common in 
“left” politics both in the United States and Europe in the early twentieth century 
(Howard, 2003: pp. 30-31). Empirical science was seen as “naturally opposing 
the rationalist and a priorist ideologies that legitimated traditional claims to au-
thority by a church and a state that were viewed as serving only a narrow class 
interest” (Howard, 2003: pp. 30-31). In this post-Darwin world, science became 
the “savior” in the battle against dogma and the “ruling classes”. 
In Europe, the philosopher and sociologist, Otto Neurath, articulated this po-
sition in his 1929 Manifesto of the Vienna Circle:  
one group of combatants, holding fast to traditional social forms, cultivates 
traditional attitudes of metaphysics and theology whose content has long 
since been superseded; while the other group, especially in central Europe, 
faces modern times, rejects these views and takes its stand on the ground of 
empirical science. (Neurath, Hahn, & Carnap, 1929: p. 317 in Howard, 
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Howard (2003: p. 38) shows how Neurath defended this position using 
standpoint theory: “The objectivity of bourgeois science may be questionable, 
but that of proletarian science is not, because of the unique social and economic 
position of the proletariat as an oppressed class”.  
The companion movement in the United States, associated with Dewey, 
linked science to a liberal, social democratic political orientation (Howard, 2003: 
p. 25). Through a reworked conception of knowledge as inter-subjective, Dewey 
blurred the dividing line between fact and value. As “organized social intelli-
gence”, science, stated Dewey, “is inherently an instrument of critically deter-
mining what is good and bad in the way of acceptance and rejection” (Dewey, 
1929: p. 423 in Howard, 2003: p. 52). Following this argument, in one of his 
more “radical” moments, Dewey used science to defend cooperative control of 
the “forces of productivity” (Dewey, 1935: pp. 54-55 in Howard, 2003: p. 52). 
Howard (2003: pp. 72-73) reflects on the factors involved in the shift from 
Dewey’s politically engaged version of science to a politically neutral version, 
which he describes as a retreat from the “realm of value”. He acknowledges the 
Cold War climate and the rise of McCarthyism in the 1950s as important factors 
affecting this trend. He also suggests that the focus on the nuclear deterrent in 
geopolitics gave added luster to physical sciences, with the human sciences “try-
ing hurriedly to bring their methodologies up to” their “high standard” (How-
ard, 2003: p. 73). For example, there was growing interest in professionalizing 
the study of education, a search for “a distinct science of the field” (Lagemann, 
1989: p. 295; emphasis added).2 
Alongside professionalization and the other factors contributing to this “turn 
to the right”, Howard (2003: p. 71, p. 74; emphasis added) emphasizes the wil-
lingness of “even the most explicitly political left-wing Vienna Circle logical em-
piricists [recalling Neurath] and Deweyan pragmatists” to march “under the 
banner of objective science”. Howard’s suggestion is that the unwavering com-
mitment to objective science and fixed “problems”, even among those on the 
“left”, allowed a technocratic version of problem-solving to gain purchase.3 The 
contribution of “the cognitive turn” to these developments is considered briefly 
in the next section. 
3.2. The Cognitive Revolution  
As mentioned above, the second model of problem-solving knowledge, charac-
 
 
2Howard (2003: pp. 72-73) argues that the “logic of professionalization” makes it easier to exclude 
“those whose opinions stray too much from the core commitments that define community mem-
bership”. As an illustration, the drive to establish professional status in the philosophy of science led 
to a dramatic narrowing of the topics addressed in the journal Philosophy of Science: “One notices 
the almost total and almost immediate disappearance of at least four genres of literature that had 
been common in the journal before 1959”—on science and values; on matters explicitly on political 
ideology; on science planning and science policy; and on the sociology of knowledge. 
3Some contemporary theorists who describe themselves as pragmatists and who draw on Dewey 
leave themselves open to technocratic problem-solving because of their unquestioned acceptance of 
“problems” as pre-existent starting points for analysis and an unwavering belief in scientific method 
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terized as “expert-led” and “technocratic”, is linked to behaviouralism and cog-
nitivism. Cognitivism demands particular attention, given current developments 
in problem-solving knowledge in PISA and PIAAC, the focus in Section 4 of the 
article.  
The economist and political scientist, Herbert A. Simon, is a leading exponent 
of the “cognitive turn”. He is a central figure in the development of artificial in-
telligence, information processing, decision-making theory and problem-solving. 
His work on “bounded rationality” (Simon, 1972) is regularly quoted in public 
policy texts (Simon et al., 1992). Both on his own and with others, including 
Alan Newell and the critical realist, Ray Bhaksar, Simon contributed important 
publications on human problem-solving (see Newell et al., 1958; Newell & Si-
mon, 1972; Bhaksar & Simon, 1977; Simon, 1978).  
Simon (1978) provides the underlying arguments for the need to develop 
“cognitive skills”—a pervasive narrative in PISA and other contemporary prob-
lem-solving initiatives, as elaborated in the next section. The focus in this ap-
proach to human cognition is on the mind’s ability to manipulate symbols as 
performed in computer simulations. The goal of learning is to find “expert” rules 
that solve a problem with less search effort and greater effectiveness than “no-
vice” rules (Bredo, 1997: p. 29). As mentioned earlier, such an approach requires 
fixed problems against which to test the process of cognitive learning and pro-
duces a “physically passive approach to learning” (Bredo, 1997: p. 30). The pre-
dominance of these views is illustrated in contemporary knowledge-making 
practices, reflecting specifically on “skill”-testing international education re-
gimes.  
4. Problem-Solving Knowledge in Contemporary  
International Organizations (Practices of Functioning)  
Returning briefly to the three interconnected domains within which a prob-
lem-solving knowledge operates—background knowledge (savoir), disciplines 
(connaissances) and governmental technologies—this section of the article ex-
amines technologies that elucidate how problem-solving knowledge functions in 
twenty-first century western societies and international organizations.  
In governmentality theory, technologies comprise the means by which go-
verning becomes practicable. They encompass specific instruments of governing, 
together with the interdependencies surrounding these instruments. They can 
take the form of league tables, performance data, case management, and the vast 
array of programs and policies enabling various authorities to “shape, normalize 
and instrumentalize” the conduct of individuals and groups (Miller & Rose, 
1990: p. 8; Inda, 2005: p. 9). Studying technologies broadens the scope of politi-
cal analysis to encompass power relations among political subjects, forms of 
knowledge and expertise (see Hogsbro & Shaw, 2017: p. 149). 
Evidence-based policy is a technology in this sense, as is lifelong learning (Fejes 
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lem-solving knowledge, include the European Commission’s (2018) website Solvit, 
offering “solutions to problems with your EU rights” (http://ec.europa.eu/solvit/), 
and the EC’s CEDEFOP Glossary, which defines “skill” as “the ability to perform 
tasks and solve problems” (European Commission, 2008: p. 164).  
Two instruments—the OECD international “skills”-testing programs, PISA 
and PIAAC—serve to illustrate the institutionalization and functioning of con-
temporary problem-solving knowledge. Beginning in 2000, PISA is a triennial 
international survey that aims to evaluate education systems worldwide by test-
ing the “skills” and knowledge of 15-year-old students. From its inception it 
examined literacy, numeracy, and cross-curricular “competencies”, including 
ICT and problem-solving “skills”. An intensifying interest in the latter is sig-
naled in the emphasis on problem-solving in the 2015 PISA assessment (OECD, 
2017). 
PIAAC collects data on adult “skills”, including literacy, numeracy and prob-
lem-solving in technology-rich environments (PS-TRE). There were three 
rounds of data collection between 2011 and 2017, with a second cycle planned 
for 2021-22. American Educational Testing Services (ETS), which overseas 
management of PISA, produced a volume in 2015, entitled America’s Skills 
Challenge: Millennials and the Future (Coley, Goodman, & Sands, 2015). This 
volume reported on the literacy, numeracy and problem-solving “skills” of 16- to 
34-year-olds in 22 countries using data from PIAAC. While these programs have 
attracted a good deal of critical attention (see Normand, 2016; Gorur, 2011, 
2016; Sellar & Lingard, 2014; Shaw & Child, 2017), to date no one has noted the 
significant role played by problem-solving knowledge within these programs, 
and the political implications that accompany its functioning—tasks undertaken 
in this section of the article.  
The OECD defines problem-solving as “the capacity to engage in cognitive 
processing to understand and resolve problem situations where a method of so-
lution is not immediately obvious.” It includes “the willingness to engage with 
such situations in order to achieve one’s potential as a constructive and reflective 
citizen”—a point taken up later in the article (OECD, 2014a). Problem-solving is 
spoken of as both a method—a scientific problem-solving method—and a cogni-
tive ability. The focus is clearly on what is measurable, an example of “governing 
by numbers” (Miller, 2001; see also Grimaldi, 2020). In the Foreword to The 
Nature of Problem Solving (Csapó & Funke, 2017: p. 4), Schelicher, OECD Di-
rector for Education and Skills, explains why PISA measures students’ prob-
lem-solving abilities: “because educators have few reliable metrics to observe the 
problem-solving skills of their students—and what doesn’t get assessed doesn’t 
get done”.4 
The declared need for problem-solving abilities and problem-solving metrics 
 
 
4Steven Lewis (2017: p. 292); emphasis in original) points out that governing by numbers is sup-
plemented with examples of best practice in the Pisa for Schools reports: “This emphasises the sig-
nificance to PISA for Schools of governance by numbers and examples, where the ‘hard’ evidence of 
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is tied to labour-market requirements. The Foreword to the summary of PISA 
2012 results on “Creative Problem Solving” made this connection explicit: 
highly skilled adults are twice as likely to be employed and almost three 
times more likely to earn an above-median salary than poorly skilled adults. 
(OECD, 2014b: p. 3; emphasis added) 
Problem-solving is designated a “21st Century skill” or “competency”—the 
type of “skill” that is increasingly required by employers given the shift from 
routine (read automated) to non-routine tasks (OECD, 2014b: p. 13, p. 26, p. 
73). 
To fulfill this market need, subjects have to become adaptable and creative. 
“Creative” problem-solving refers to an ability to apply problem-solving as a 
method of analysis to novel situations. Students are to take charge of assigned 
“problems” and to engage in lifelong learning to assure their flexibility in an un-
certain world—described as a VUCA world (management-speak for a world that 
is Volatile, Uncertain, Complex and Ambiguous) (OECD, 2014b: p. 26).  
A 2017 contribution from Dirk Van Damme, Head of the Innovation and 
Measuring Progress Division, Directorate for Education and Skills, indicates the 
instrumental logic at work in OECD thinking. His brief article is entitled intri-
guingly: “Does the world need people who understand problems, or who can 
solve them?” Understanding, it appears, is unnecessary if a person can figure out 
“what works”. There is a clear link here to evidence-based policy and its prob-
lem-solving logic, mentioned earlier. Van Damme (2017) concludes: “it is not 
difficult to predict that tomorrow’s world will need more problem solvers”.5 
The OECD has developed a conceptual architecture around “problems” and 
“problem-solving”, which forms part of a vast web of interrelated concepts, in-
cluding “wellbeing” (OECD, 2015) and “human capital” (Morgan & Volante, 
2016). The list below is illustrative rather than comprehensive:  
Complex and simple problems (and Complex Problem Solving—CPS—see 
Greiff & Fischer, 2013) 
Creative Problem Solving 
Well-structured problems and poorly-structured problems 
Real-world problems versus laboratory experiments 
Expert versus novice problem solving 
Domain-specific versus domain-general problem solving 
Interactive versus static problem solving 
Dynamic problem solving 
Adaptive Problem Solving (APS) (see Greiff et al., 2017) 
Collaborative Problem Solving (CPS) (Shaw & Child, 2017) 
Problem Solving in Technology-Rich Environments (PS-TRE) 
 
 
5On a recent visit to Roskilde University (8-9 October 2018) a banner displayed at the nearby train 
station declared: “Welcome to more than 1800 new problemsolvers” [“Velkommen til mere end 
1800 nye problemløsere”.] The author wishes to thank Agnete Meldgaard Hansen for bringing the 
banner to her attention. The banner signifies both the pervasiveness and presumed innocence of 
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Computer-Supported Collaborative Learning (CSCL) (Stahl, 2015) 
“Problems” in OECD problem-solving approaches are conceptualized as 
pre-existent states that prompt analysis, as “problems-that-exist”. For example, 
the PIAAC Conceptual Framework locates as a starting point for analysis “the 
problem statement”—the “elements of a situation that trigger and condition 
problem solving” (PIAAC Expert Group, 2009: p. 11).  
Collaborative Problem Solving (CPS), a recent addition to the OECD lexicon 
(OECD, 2017), marks an attempt to move beyond earlier renditions of prob-
lem-solving that focused on individuals. The stated goal of collaborative prob-
lem-solving is to “construct and maintain a shared conception of a problem” 
(Roschelle & Teasley, 1995: p. 70). “Problems” therefore remain exogenous to 
the policy process and taken-for-granted starting points for analysis. Moreover, 
the emphasis on producing a “shared conception of a problem” reduces the 
space for dissensus, a point returned to later. Finally, while the move towards 
interaction appears a significant advance on solitary problem-solving, it is im-
portant to note that the interaction—the collaboration—takes place with com-
puters, called “conversational agents”, a development that has generated a new 
industry—CSCL (Computer-Supported Collaborative Learning) (Lajoie & Der-
ry, 2013; Stahl, 2015). 
Adaptive Problem Solving (APS), another recent development, is clearly in-
tended to challenge a view of learners as static and passive. There are moves to 
incorporate a measure of APS in the second cycle of PIAAC (Greiff et al., 2017). 
The emphasis in “adaptive problem solving” is on the need for problem solvers 
to revisit and revise the initial problem when there is new information. While 
the “problem” is thus open to modification, the goal is to gain accurate compre-
hension of a “problem-that-exists”, taken to be independent from the processes 
of examination. As Herbert A. Simon (1973: p. 195) puts it, “the problem solver 
is faced at each moment with a well structured problem, but one that changes 
from moment to moment.”  
Alongside the increased focus on problem-solving in these programs sits an 
intensified interest in “cognitive abilities”. In OECD publications prob-
lem-solving is commonly referred to as a “higher order” cognitive skill asso-
ciated with the brain’s “executive function”. The Expert Group’s Conceptual 
Framework for PS-TRE stipulates that: “The ability to solve problems is consi-
dered one of the most complex and sophisticated aspects of human cognition” 
(PIAAC Expert Group, 2009: p. 7). Newell and Simon’s 1972 book, Human 
Problem Solving, is offered as a reference (PIAAC Expert Group, 2009). The 
Framework specifies that: “The cognitive dimensions of problem solving are 
considered the central object of the assessment” (2009: 15). “Cognitive dimen-
sions” of problem-solving involve “the mental structures by which a person ac-
tually performs problem solving”. These include: “goal setting and monitoring 
progress; planning; locating; selecting and evaluating information; and organiz-
ing and transforming information” (PIAAC Expert Group, 2009: p. 11).  
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worrisome trend towards forms of determinism in ranking and evaluating hu-
man worth. The question of whether cognitive abilities are innate or shaped en-
vironmentally is seldom addressed directly, and it is left to the researcher to hunt 
down positions on this contentious issue. It is unusual to find an explicit stance 
such as this unequivocal declaration in Greiff et al. (2017; emphasis added), in 
an OECD Working Paper:  
Most of these fundamental cognitive processes are not generally considered 
malleable (or at least very difficult to do so) and are expected to affect suc-
cess in answering numeracy and literacy items as well as problem-solving 
tasks. 
The American National Research Council (Pellegrino & Hilton, 2012: Sum 3 
fn 1) argues that the “common view” is that cognitive abilities are “fixed traits”, 
although the Council itself declares them “malleable dimensions of human be-
havior that can change in response to educational interventions and life expe-
riences”. 
In PISA the clear impression is that some students are (simply) good at prob-
lem-solving while others are less successful. The scoring system records six levels 
of proficiency, with detailed descriptions of what students “can typically do” 
(OECD, 2014b: p. 57). Students with high scores become “top performers” and 
the implications for their future are clear:  
As machines and computers are increasingly replacing humans for per-
forming routine tasks, highly skilled workers, who are capable of applying 
their unique skills flexibly in a variety of contexts, regulating their own 
learning, and handling novel situations, are more and more in demand. 
(OECD, 2014b: p. 60; emphasis added) 
Meanwhile, important links are drawn between “cognitive abilities” and eco-
nomic performance, with explicit policy implications. The OECD (2010: p. 3) 
uses economic modeling produced by Eric Hanushek et al. (2015) “to relate cog-
nitive skills—as measured by PISA and other international instruments—to 
economic growth”. Based on PIAAC results, Hanushek et al. (2015: p. 104) de-
velop “estimates of the earnings returns to cognitive skills across the entire labor 
force for 23 countries”. Leaving causal explanations ambiguous, their study con-
cludes: “Intriguingly, returns to [cognitive] skills are systematically lower in 
countries with higher union density, stricter employment protection legislation, 
and larger public sectors” (Hanushek at el., 2015: p. 103, p. 123). The political 
implications of this conclusion receive no further comment. 
Nikolas Rose (2004) suggests that there are signs in current sociopolitical rela-
tions that we are moving from a psychological view of the subject to a somatic 
view, with the latter focusing on biological brain and body functions. The privi-
leging of cognitive skills and of problem-solving as a key part of this “skill set”, 
observed in PISA and PIAAC programs, supports this proposition. However, a 
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sis on cognitive abilities in PISA and PIAAC tests are questions that target 
non-cognitive “characteristics”, specifically “motivation” and a “willingness to 
engage” with “problem situations” (see above in OECD definition of prob-
lem-solving; OECD, 2014a). Through the focus on “motivation”, a moralizing 
element appears in problem-solving knowledge, a moralizing element that relies 
upon and produces “motivation” as an individual trait (Ahl, 2006).  
For example, 2012 PISA results link “high achievement in mathematics” to 
“high levels on the index of openness to problem solving, a measure of general 
drive and motivation” (OECD, 2014b: p. 111; emphasis added). The National 
Research Council, quoted earlier to reference their less deterministic view on 
“cognitive abilities”, shares the OECD’s judgment on “intrapersonal dimensions 
of learning”. Their “cluster” of “21st century competencies” includes:  
Work Ethic (aligned with the personality factor of Conscientiousness), in-
cluding such skills as initiative and self direction, responsibility, Type 1 
self-regulation (metacognition, including forethought, performance, and 
self-reflection), and perseverance. (Pellegrino & Hilton, 2012: Sum 3) 
In PISA these “personality factors” become linked directly to presumed cogni-
tive ability:  
Everything in the PISA data indicates that high levels of perseverance and 
openness to problem solving, work as a catalyst for ever-higher perfor-
mance among the most talented students. (OECD, 2014b: p. 111; emphasis 
added) 
This reference to “most talented students” implies the existence of a natural 
pool of “talent”. Moreover, the phrasing also suggests that only the “most ta-
lented” will benefit from “perseverance”, leaving those “naturally” “less talented” 
stuck in a category where opportunities to succeed are few. Hence, both “biolog-
ical” mental capacity and “personal” psychological “traits” are subject to in-
creasing scrutiny and judgment (see Sellar & Lingard, 2014). 
As with problem-solving knowledge generally, there is no space in PISA or 
PIAAC testing regimes for students or adults to question the “problems” set for 
solving. There are numerous references to the need to use “real-world problems” 
in order to “engage” students (OECD, 2014b). Common suggestions include a 
new type of vending machine or an MP3 player that refuses to work properly 
(OECD, 2014b). Some reformers, highly critical of PISA programs, make child-
ren’s participation a core element of problem-solving (Richardson et al., 2017; 
Zhao, 2017). However, so long as students are expected to memorize and apply 
an established and generally accepted scientific problem-solving process to 
“given” problems, they are constituted as passive. As Popkewitz (2004: p. 25) 
argues,  
the problem-solving strategies taught in school subjects may actually reduce 
the spaces that are open for participation and action because scientific ex-
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It could, of course, be argued that PISA is irrelevant, that it has no impact on 
local and national schooling practices. There are, however, many examples 
where changes in school organization and curricula have followed directly from 
“poor” performance in international league tables (Cresswell, 2016). Hence, it 
becomes important to consider how PISA establishes its authority, and the im-
plications for researchers.  
4.1. The Investment in “Problems” 
On this issue, it is clear that many academics have benefitted through investing 
their experience in European or international educational programs, illustrating 
a mutual interdependence of expertise and “the state” (Foucault, 1991b; John-
son, 1995; Normand, 2016: pp. 12-13). Waldow (2009: p. 481) provides an ex-
ample: “The enormous resonance of the PISA debate has led to a massive expan-
sion of empirical educational research of the PISA-type in Germany”. As Gorur 
(2016) argues, it is becoming increasingly difficult not to “see like PISA”. 
The investment in PISA-associated research illustrates a larger research phe-
nomenon, aptly described as an “investment in problems”. The argument here is 
that “problems” as self-evident referents, as “problems-that-exist”, become the 
bread and butter of many, if not most, researchers (see Pienaar et al., 2018: pp. 
14-16). In a study of alcohol and other drug policy, for example, Bacchi (2015b) 
found that the notion of “alcohol problems” emerged as a category of analysis in 
large part due to researchers’ concern to establish credibility for their work. 
Writing about 20th century alcohol and drug policy research, Sulkunen and 
Warsell (2012: p. 219) explain that, “Because, with effort and ingenuity, ‘prob-
lems’ can be counted, they fit the positivist paradigm that characterized the new 
public health endeavor at the time”. This symbiosis between “problems” and re-
search helps to explain the popularity of evidence-based initiatives, prob-
lem-solving methodologies and, relatedly, the prevailing positivist research pa-
radigm. Problem-solving knowledge therefore plays a central role, not only in 
the making of school students, but also in the making of university academics 
and research paradigms (see Normand, 2016).  
Attempts to disrupt problem-solving knowledge come from several directions. 
Section 5 of the article considers briefly the critical potential of three important 
forms of contestation: first, interpretive challenges to “given” problems; second, 
philosophical challenges to a problem-solving model of the human condition; 
and third Foucault-influenced poststructural analysis, including WPR (Bacchi, 
2009; Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016).  
5. Contesting Problem-Solving Knowledge 
It is important to recognize the challenge posed to technocratic problem-solving 
by interpretivists, including those mentioned previously who investigate com-
peting framings of “problems” and who promote a dialogue-based, deliberative 
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(2017) entitled Democratic Problem Solving: Dialogues in Social Epistemology 
provides a useful example of this position. The argument in this volume, put 
briefly, is that problem-solving can be redeemed, that it can lose its “narrowly 
scientistic connotations” and become connected with “permanent open-ended 
critique” (Kemp, 2017: p. 30). The stated objective is to change “the terms of 
reference that currently frame problems, to find more useful problems” 
(Cruickshank & Sassower, 2017: xii; emphasis added). Despite the valuable rec-
ognition of the need to prevent premature closure on important debates, the 
suggestion that it is possible to find “more useful problems” indicates that dem-
ocratic problem-solving conceptualizes problems as (simply) “things-that-exist”, 
limiting the space for contestation.  
The prominent Harvard philosopher, Stanley Cavell, offers a second form of 
disruption, questioning the implications of problem-solving knowledge for the 
human condition. In interview Cavell declares: 
I don’t believe that human existence is just one damn problem after anoth-
er. And in reading Dewey, who was my first love in philosophy, you can 
sort of get that idea: “You have a problem—well, let’s see what the problem 
is, and we solve it, and then we go on.” “Yes, I have a problem: I’m going to 
die, so let’s solve that for me!” (Richardson, 2011; emphasis in original) 
Cavell is concerned that the “depth of psychoanalytic discovery” is missing 
from Dewey’s text (Cavell, 1990: p. 13 in Saito & Standish, 2009: p. 161). In his 
view, “mourning,” “suffering,” “patience,” and “passion” are “more representa-
tive elements of human experience, at odds with the active tendency in Dewey’s 
science” (Cavell, 1998: p. 73, p. 76, p. 78 in Saito & Standish, 2009: p. 158). For 
Cavell, the “sense of the riven” is missing in Dewey’s “ameliorative response to 
the tragic” (Saito & Standish, 2009: p. 162). Looking to political implications, 
Saito and Standish (2009: p. 57) note that the focus on amelioration in De-
wey-influenced pragmatism produces a desire for consensus, leaving insufficient 
space for dissensus, a theme noted earlier in OECD Collaborative Problem 
Solving.  
The third form of disruption is mounted in poststructural critical analysis, as 
illustrated in this article. In this view interpretivism is restricted in its critical 
ability through its continued acceptance of “problems-that-exist”. There is also 
hesitation to endorse grand claims about the impact of problem-solving on the 
human condition, as per Cavell. The grounds for staking out a position critical 
of problem-solving include the “turn to cognition” with its associated moralism 
and the way it is being deployed to divide “citizens” into successful and unsuc-
cessful categories. More broadly, treating “problems” as self-evident referents is 
considered to be depoliticizing, undermining the ability to recognize how go-
verning takes place through problematization—through the shaping of “prob-
lems” as particular sorts of problems.  
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thought involves being able to question the premises of taken-for-granted belief 
systems. He argues that for students to become critical thinkers, they need to be 
able to ask questions about assumed knowledges, including the scientific me-
thod. The Foucault-influenced WPR (“What’s the Problem Represented to be?”) 
analytic strategy, introduced earlier, encourages precisely the kind of critical 
thought Popkewitz has in mind. It challenges the assumed givenness of “prob-
lems” and provides a way to interrogate their premises and the knowledges upon 
which they rely, potentially engaging students in “a process of open problemati-
sation” (see Farrugia et al., 2018 for an example of this form of application of 
WPR).  
At the same time there is a need to acknowledge that we, as researchers, may 
well be engaged in producing “truths” that can have deleterious implications 
through our “investment in problems” (see discussion in Section 4.1). The task, 
as Chantal Mouffe (1996: p. 6) describes it, is to avoid complacency. Foucault 
(2000) calls for an “ethic of discomfort”. In tune with these interventions, the 
WPR approach includes, as Step 7, self-problematization (Bacchi & Goodwin, 
2016: p. 20). In self-problematization, researchers are exhorted to apply the 
WPR questions to their own proposals and proposed “solutions”. The goal is to 
open up their own problematizations to critical scrutiny as a form of 
“self-deconstructing” analysis (Chia, 1996: p. 49). 
6. Conclusion  
This article develops the argument that a particular approach to thinking, prob-
lem-solving, dominates the current intellectual and policy landscape. An abbre-
viated genealogy examines the operation of this problem-solving knowledge in 
several fields, including mathematics, science studies, public policy and educa-
tion studies. This brief survey highlights the twists and turns leading to the cur-
rent dominance of a technocratic problem-solving model. The article proceeds 
to examine how this problem-solving knowledge functions in the important in-
ternational “skills”-testing programs, PISA and PIAAC. It emphasizes how these 
programs produce passive and divided subjects, and reinforce a positivist para-
digm in research approaches, while drawing attention to ways of contesting 
these views.  
The paper does not presume that all those who work with specific incarna-
tions of problem-solving knowledge are somehow misguided. Nor does it sug-
gest that problem-solving knowledge can be dethroned from its epistemological 
pedestal. Still, the case is made that it is politically exigent to reflect on how 
problem-solving knowledge has come to be taken-for-granted as “truth” and on 
how it operates to limit political debate and to regulate political subjects. To this 
end it calls for refocusing attention on how governing takes place through the 
production of “problems” as particular sorts of problem—through problemati-
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